Outline Chambers Briefings | Commentary

Shifting the Goalposts: Haxhia v Albania and the Limits of Further Information in Part 2 Extradition Requests

Matei Clej, Outline Chambers

In Haxhia, Mithan, Simpson, Bridgeman and Hunt v Republic of Albania [2026] EWHC 956 (Admin), handed down on 24.04.2026, Mr Justice Swift issued a significant judgment on the validity of Part 2 extradition requests under the Extradition Act 2003. The case came before the Administrative Court as a rolled-up hearing of statutory appeals under s.103 and parallel judicial review claims against the Secretary of State's extradition orders. The decision extends the reasoning of the Divisional Court in Birbeck v Principality of Andorra [2023] EWHC 1740 (Admin) and imposes a clear constraint on the use of further information and assurances to reshape an extradition request after certification by the Secretary of State.

Background

The five Appellants — Edmond Haxhia, Thomas Mithan, Harry Simpson, Harriet Bridgeman and Steven Hunt — were sought by Albania in connection with the death of Ardian Nikulaj in Shengjin, Lezha, on 19.04.2023. The original extradition requests, certified by the Home Secretary under s.70 of the 2003 Act, alleged offences under Article 78/a of the Albanian Criminal Code (murder due to blood feud) and Article 278/1 (illegal possession of firearms), each read with Article 25 (complicity). Article 78/a carries a minimum sentence of 30 years' imprisonment or life.

By the time the extradition hearing began at Westminster Magistrates' Court, the position had materially changed. Following further information provided in September 2023, the firearms charges were abandoned for all Appellants. For Mr Mithan, Mr Simpson, Mr Hunt and Ms Bridgeman, the Article 78/a charge had been replaced with a charge under Article 78 (premeditated murder). For Mr Haxhia, the District Judge — having accepted that prosecution under Article 78/a would create a real risk of an irreducible life sentence contrary to Article 3 ECHR — sought and obtained an assurance from the Albanian prosecutor's office that he too would only be prosecuted under Article 78. On that basis, the cases were sent to the Secretary of State, who duly issued extradition orders.

The Birbeck principle extended

In Birbeck, the Divisional Court held that the s.70 certificate is not conclusive of validity at the extradition hearing. The District Judge retains a free-standing duty to be satisfied that the request before the court meets the requirements of s.70(4) — namely (a) that the requested person is accused in the Category 2 territory of the commission of an offence specified in the request, and (b) that the request is made with a view to that person's arrest and extradition for the purpose of being prosecuted for the offence. Unless so satisfied, the court has no jurisdiction to proceed under s.78(7).

The novel question in Haxhia was whether the request before the court at the extradition hearing must be the same request as that certified by the Secretary of State. Swift J held, unequivocally, that it must (§ 23). Any other conclusion would render s.70 redundant, and the entire Part 2 scheme proceeds on the premise that the extradition hearing should concern the request the Secretary of State has received and certified.

His Lordship rejected the submission that further information can be used to substitute one request for another (§ 24). The legitimate purpose of further information is to supplement or better explain an existing request — not to withdraw it and replace it with a different one. Nor was the substitution of Article 78 for Article 78/a a mere change of form: under the Albanian Code each constitutes a distinct criminal offence, and Part 2 requests are defined by reference to identified offences (§ 25).

The treatment of assurances is equally significant. While assurances are routinely accepted to address potential bars to extradition (most commonly prison conditions), Swift J held that they cannot legitimately be deployed as vehicles to convert a request seeking extradition for one offence into a request for another offence (§ 26). That consequence falls outside any legitimate objective of an assurance.

The judicial review claims

The judgment also clarifies the formal requirements of s.93 extradition orders. Each order in this case had purported to extradite the Appellants "for the charges within the extradition request" — i.e. Articles 78/a and 278/1 — when those charges were no longer pursued. Swift J held (albeit obiter — the appeals having succeeded on the validity ground with the consequence that the orders of the Secretary of State fell to be quashed in any event) that an extradition order must identify the offences for which extradition is ordered, whether expressly or by incorporation by reference, and must not refer to offences outside the case sent by the District Judge (§§ 33–37).

The modifications made by the Extradition Act 2003 (Multiple Offences) Order 2003 to s.93(4) reinforce that the Secretary of State's analysis must be carried out offence-by-offence: where a request concerns more than one offence, the Secretary of State must address the bars to extradition in respect of each offence separately and order extradition only for those offences in respect of which no bar applies. It follows, even where a request concerns a single offence, that any extradition order must concern that offence and no other.

The proviso in the order made in respect of Mr Hunt — qualifying extradition to the extent that the charges had "not been withdrawn or abandoned" — was held to leave the order identifying no charge at all.

Practical implications for practitioners

The judgment opens a new line of validity challenge in Part 2 cases where the requested offence has shifted between certification and the extradition hearing. Defence practitioners should:

1. Review Part 2 cases to compare the offences in the original request against those pursued at the extradition hearing. Any material change — including substitution of one Code provision for another, even where the underlying conduct is identical — is now potentially fatal to jurisdiction.
   

2. Resist any attempt by the requesting state to use further information as a vehicle for substituting offences, and resist reliance by the requesting state on any assurance that has the same effect.
   

3. Scrutinise s.93 orders for compliance with the implicit identification requirement. Orders referring to offences not before the District Judge are vulnerable to judicial review.
   

Conclusion

Haxhia is a welcome reaffirmation of the requirement of structural integrity in the Part 2 scheme. The s.70 certificate is the gateway to the entire process. What passes through that gateway must be what the court considers at the extradition hearing. Requesting states cannot, by means of further information or assurances, depart mid-process from the offences as certified by the Secretary of State.

Matei Clej is a barrister at Outline Chambers, with a particular focus on extradition law and criminal defence.